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Latour and Eighteenth-Century Literary Studies 
-- Christina Lupton and Sean Silver with Adam Sneed 
 
1. Latour and the Question of History 
Almost every major theorist read in English departments over the last three 
decades has touched base with the eighteenth century.  Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Habermas, Foucault, Said, and Derrida all lay special weight upon the period as one 
from which we must break away or make our peace.  Latour joins this influential list 
of scholars for whom the Enlightenment remains key to understanding, and perhaps 
to overcoming, the modern terms of existence.  The argument for which he is best 
known, that the distinction between subject and object is the lie on which modernity 
is based, traces that lie to the long eighteenth century.  It was here, Latour notes, that 
distinctions between mind and matter, res cogitans and res extensa, were worked out 
in the first place.  In this light, a special issue on Latour’s relevance to eighteenth-
century literature follows a trajectory that Latour himself endorses. 
The eighteenth century has been seen by many as registering a break between, 
on the one hand, a confidence in the integrity of the modern subject, and, on the other, 
a serene satisfaction with the concreteness of the modern object.  This is, in Latour’s 
project, the place where modernity got off track.  Latour’s sense of the vibrant 
primacy of networks of persons and things, of the co-implication of humans and non-
humans in collectives, is designed to stitch up this gap.  But it also reminds us that the 
image of the eighteenth century as a site of their separation is merely a caricature.  
Latour invites us to revisit the early decades of modernity as a period actively feeling 
its way through the manifold crossings between persons and things, sometimes 
attempting to disentangle them, but also often not.  It is with this sense of productive 
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possibility, of the recovery of paths taken or not, opportunities accepted or declined, 
that this collection makes its return to the literature of the 1700s. 
Yet it remains true that Latour’s style of thought, aside from sweeping 
gestures towards “modernity” or “empiricism,” is relatively resistant to historical 
narrative.  Precisely the things that make it original as a brand of theory also make it 
more difficult to parse as relevant to historians.  Upon first reading, for instance, most 
of Latour’s work seems invested in the close, latitudinal description of networks.  His 
influential Actor-Network Theory is dedicated to offering the tools making analysis 
of these networks possible.  This attention to the precise textures of productive 
exchanges between “actants” is one aspect of his work that has made it compelling 
for literary scholars; the tools he provides remind us of the productive ways that 
literary texts themselves produce meaning through networks of signs, concepts, and 
materials, even while being embedded, in their turn, in productive networks of which 
books, ideas, and authors may be equally small parts.  More than one essay in this 
collection invests itself in unpacking the stakes of a particular moment, of an object, 
poem, or mode of being as the particular sedimentation of such a nexus of 
relationships.   
Arguably, however, this latitudinal or synchronic tendency presents an 
obstacle to the long stories that Latour wants to tell, and that authorize the peculiar 
importance of the eighteenth century to his thought.  Focused attention on the “mode 
of existence” that Latour has recently named [net] for “Network,” can rule out ways 
of thinking about history as the development of ideas or institutions over time.1  
Latour’s fine-grained analyses of laboratory practices, the analysis of pasteurization 
that showed what was possible with this approach, or his strangely compelling 
“scientifiction” of a Paris-based personal rapid transit system, all produce such effects 
                                                        
1 Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into the Modes of Existence: An Anthropology of the 
Moderns (Cambridge, 2013). 
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of embedded presentness that it is hard to imagine tracing these delicate structures for 
more than a few years, months, or, in some cases, even days.2  
Michael Serres, the philosopher who became one of Latour’s most important 
early interlocutors, makes the point that Latour’s accounts appear stiff when aspiring 
to capture changes and shifts in networks over time.  In this context, Serres discounts 
the project of reducing a network to its actants, likening such an undertaking to 
describing a rugby match in which the players don’t move.  An alternative model 
would have to take into account the motion of the players themselves, reintroducing 
time in such a way that, as Latour himself suggests in conversation with Serres, 
“synthesis would come about in the area of passes, of movement, and not in the area 
of objects.”  This would involve tracing the ball as the center of a shifting field, with 
the teams placing themselves around it, playing off the ball and the ball playing off 
them.  Or it would mean, as Serres puts it in his particularly mobile style, tracing 
human history as a sheet of flame, coming from somewhere, oriented towards an 
emptiness, joining together, fragmenting, dying out. “Networks,” Serres insists, 
“leave an image in space that is almost too stable… [I]f you immerse it in time, this 
network is going to fluctuate, become very unstable, and bifurcate endlessly.”3   
In Jonathan Lamb’s account of the difference between Latour and Serres in 
this volume, Latour’s reluctance to let go of the ball means that Serres, who holds 
time much more firmly in view, remains the more pathfinding historian of the two.  
Although Latour has the stronger investment in junctures where representation and 
primary experience merge—an investment that aligns him interestingly with Hume, 
and with Lucretius—this means that he forsakes an account of the way representation 
                                                        
2 Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Construction of Scientific Facts 
(Princeton, 1986); Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers 
through Society (Cambridge, 1988); The Pasteurization of France (Cambridge, 
1993); and Latour, Aramis: or The Love of Technology (Cambridge, 1996). 
3 Michel Serres with Bruno Latour, Conversations on Science, Culture, and Time, 
transl. Roxanne Lapidus (Ann Arbor, 1995), 109. 
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cuts through time, shortcuts space.  By analogy, the piece of paper that can be laid out 
flat, like a map with criss-crossing lines, can also be crumpled up so that points far 
distant are made to meet in unexpected configurations.4  It is Serres, perhaps along 
with Deleuze, who is left to make the case for time in this way, not as a clean layering 
of moments one upon another, but as a muddling of temporalities.   
As Lamb points out, however, Latour’s project over the last 25 years—
beginning with We Have Never Been Modern (1991), and continuing, in its most 
mature form, right up to his Inquiry into Modes of Existence (2013)—can in some 
ways be seen as his response to these critiques, casting light upon how much of his 
recent work has been interested precisely in the problem of history.  Broadly 
speaking, we may say that Latour invites the historical back into his work along two 
routes.  In the first form, he is interested in how the past is embedded in particular 
instances: gestures, habits, tools, and texts.  In its simplest form, he tends to prefer 
accounts of history as they may be elicited from particular technologies—that is, the 
way that practices, paired with gadgets, evolve with reference to each other.  This is 
what Latour, in his most recent monograph, calls [REP], for “reproduction”: the 
persistence of a thing across the risky leaps it makes to “reproduce” itself.5  
Something like a sea-chart, Latour notes, is the accretion of techniques and insights of 
an array of former mariners and their instruments; it represents, in this sense, the 
distillation of an age of wisdom, knowing far more than any single person who could 
compose it.6  Under the right conditions, speed bumps, seat belts, and door closers all 
flash into significance as the sedimentations of evolving relationships over time. 7  
                                                        
4 Serres and Latour, Conversations, 60. 
5 Latour, Modes of Existence, 99-110 
6 Latour first poses this example in “Visualization and Cognition: Thinking with 
Hands and Eyes,” Knowledge and Society: Studies in the Sociology of Culture Past 
and Present 6 (1986): 3-4. 
7 Latour, “Where are the Missing Masses: The Sociology of a Few Mundane 
Artifacts,” in Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical 
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 But in its more advanced form, Latour rules out what he (after Serres) calls 
“laminar” time, the geological strata of one period building on another while 
remaining absolutely distinct.  Actants call for a theory of “turbulent” time, of the 
present tumbled up with the past.  A carpenter (Latour suggests) carries an electric 
drill, but he also carries a hammer; the electric drill is one of the latest gadgets, but 
the hammer is among the oldest—and in any case the drill too contains a series of 
levers, wheels and axles, inclined planes, everything oriented to drive a screw, the 
most primitive sorts of machines mixed up with the latest.8  Latour in effect invites 
history actively into the network.   
This brings us back to the first way of imagining the importance of the 
eighteenth century to Latour’s project, and the importance of Latour to the eighteenth 
century, albeit from an angle that enmeshes past and present.  The Enlightenment, 
Latour argues, is roughly as far back as modern networks can be usefully traced.  
Latour therefore stumbles on a problem that has been pressing to scholars in the field 
of eighteenth century studies for some time, which is simply the question of how long 
the long eighteenth century had ought to be.  This is a disciplinary question, to which 
we suppose that the answer is the eighteenth century must expand and contract as it 
becomes differently enmeshed in different networks of actants.  In other words, 
Latour asks us to envision the present moment as continually, differently tangled up 
with the eighteenth century, our investments as existing in complex exchange with 
orders of actants long absent or far distant.  As Sean Silver points out, in his essay in 
this collection, this means that small bits of the eighteenth century are continually 
turning up in our own; we may, as Silver notes, locate, in a small, habitual gesture 
employed by Latour himself, a small scrap of the thought of Robert Hooke.  What is 
                                                                                                                                                              
Change (Cambridge, 1992): 225-58; Latour, Pandora’s Hope: Essays on the Reality 
of Science Studies (Cambridge, 1999): 174-215. 
8 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 75. 
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more, we may indeed trace a whole way of thinking, and a way of coordinating 
subject and object, thinker and tool—in this case, the thesis of “extended 
cognition”—from Latour back to Hooke.  The past, in this way, is not cut off from the 
present.  As Joseph Roach notes in a similar context, we should be thinking of the 
eighteenth century not as a “long” one, but as a “deep” one.  The deep eighteenth 
century is “the one that isn’t over yet”; it is “not merely a period of time, but a kind of 
time,” which continues to bubble up into our own—whether we are looking for it or 
not.9 
 
2.  From Science Studies to ANT 
 
The second way that Latour addresses history is through a subtler, though 
often more sweeping, claim about the way we address the world.  The first way of 
looking at history is to analyse the debts of the past in actants of the present.  The 
second way is to trace much broader ways of being in the world, as they have evolved 
in the world.  This is what, in his latest monograph, he calls a “mode of existence,” a 
batch of different ways of being that became split from one another around the time 
of the beginning of the Enlightenment.  In its earliest form, this cluster of modes is 
simply what Latour calls “modernity,” a structure of avowal and disavowal that cuts 
across space and time, but which nevertheless continues to make seventeenth- and 
eighteenth-century Europe strangely present.  The long eighteenth century has a 
special significance for this project, for it was then, in Latour’s account, that 
modernity’s particular species of complicit denial may best be said to have begun.  
This is the case Latour makes in We Have Never Been Modern, kicking off his 
demonstration of the paradox of modernity with a return to Restoration London.  
                                                        
9 Joseph Roach, It (Ann Arbor, 2007), 13. 
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Latour directs our attention to the paper debates between Thomas Hobbes and Robert 
Boyle, so elegantly unpacked by Simon Schaffer and Steven Shapin.10  Boyle, whose 
laboratory is an important site in this account, was one of the first champions of the 
“fact,” species of which his laboratory was invented to isolate.  But he was, Latour 
notes, perhaps more importantly an innovator in mobilizing vast forces, technological 
achievements, and hosts of colleagues to produce this seemingly self-sufficient 
modern institution.  More than anything else, the modern fact dramatizes the peculiar 
double-move of modernity; produced through remarkable technical inventions, 
networks of mutual attestation, huge outlays of capital, and so forth, it is nevertheless 
offered as though it were simply discovered, untouched by the forces that produced 
it.11 
Here, then, is a plausible fountainhead for the peculiar blindness of the 
modern moment: science is seemingly split from society, created as its own 
overpowerful and autonomous system, at the same time that this apparent autonomy 
is accomplished through deeper and deeper entanglements.  Hobbes, for his part, was 
at the same time insisting on the absolute truth of the social system, what he called 
the Leviathan.  Just as Boyle’s fact was buttressed by disavowing the social 
complexity required to summon it up, so Hobbes was deliberately ignoring the 
historical evidence that Leviathan needed to prop itself up.  This double-move, the 
society of mutual witnessing disavowing itself as a network, and the network 
disavowing the role of mutual witnessing, characterises truth telling as one of the 
modes that in Latour’s account begins in the late seventeenth century but remains 
with us today.  In its most recent form, it is what Latour calls [DC] for “double-
                                                        
10 Steven Shapin and Simon Schaffer, Leviathan and the Air-Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, 
and the Experimental Life (Princeton, 1985). 
11 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, transl. Catherine Porter (Cambridge, 1993), 
13-29. 
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click.”12  This is what, according to Latour, Boyle’s strategy of disavowed mutuality 
(or its symmetrical opposite) looks like in the computer age. 
We may say, then, that analysis of technological networks of the sort in 
Boyle’s laboratory form the ground and fountainhead for Latour’s later theoretical 
contributions.  As ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny, so Latour’s own career repeats 
what he describes happening in a long historical view.  Latour did his apprenticeship 
in the sociology of science in the ‘70s.  His first work in this line was a series of 
striking ethnographies of laboratory life; this he expanded into more sweeping 
considerations of how laboratories produce knowledge.13  But his career was shaped 
during the so-called “Science Wars,” an academic conflict in the nineties between a 
loose group of concerned scientists and a range of postmodern critics.  When the lines 
were drawn between, on the one hand, caricatures of the academic left, and, on the 
other, misrepresentations of scientific community on the relative right, Latour was 
positioned to notice the categorical impasse as part of a greater regime of dualist 
thinking.14  Put differently, Latour was positioned to argue that the objectivism of the 
right, just like the relativism of the left, were each and equally the effects of networks.  
What was needed, according to Latour’s way of thinking, was a reinvigoration of 
sensitivity to the ways that knowledge is made.  Science could insist on facts that 
speak themselves, even while employing more and more sophisticated technologies to 
elicit them; Poststructuralism could insist on the primacy of discourse, even while 
embedding that discourse in vast networks of persons, institutions, and things.  
Viewed at a very coarse-grained level, each was engaged in the same pattern of 
purification and hybridization; each was mistaking the outcome (facts, conversation 
                                                        
12 Latour, Modes of Existence, 199. 
13 Latour and Steve Woolgar, Laboratory Life: The Social Construction of Scientific 
Facts (New York, 1979); Latour, Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and 
Engineers through Society (Cambridge, 1987). 
14 Especially in Pandora’s Hope (1999). 
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without end) as the process, while each was embedded in a world constituted in part 
by what appeared to be its opposite.  This was, of course, what Latour had already 
witnessed in the paper-wars between Hobbes and Boyle. 
In his subsequent series of studies, Latour’s commitment was to finding a way 
out of this bind by laying the accusation of “modernism” equally at the feet of social 
constructionist and empirical scientist.  What emerged was the general set of 
observations called “Actor-Network Theory,” formalized in Reassembling the Social 
(2005).15 Here is a set of tools, a way of thinking through institutions as the offspring 
of networks of actants, which could be applied much more generally in cultural study.  
As Latour himself notes, in his most mature, syncretic work, “the very notion of 
network (this time in the sense of the Actor-Network Theory) cut its teeth, as it were, 
on the foregoing domain of technology”; the paradoxical disavowals of the sort 
encountered in the example of the carpenter, in other words, provided the basic 
pattern for Latour’s more programmatic theory of actor-networks.16  The way 
forward, in these terms, is not a “dialectic” of modernity, which would sacrifice the 
middle ground of meaning-making networks.  The way out is to discover that we 
have never been modern, that the claims of modernity were frustrated by their 
constitution from the outset.  
Despite the waning of the oppositional thinking that provided the ground for 
Latour’s account of modernity (science versus postmodernism, objectivity versus 
relativism, and so on) Latour has not ceased to remain important in the field of 
science and technology studies.  He has also helped developed sets of theoretical tools 
that have become powerful in historical, cultural, and literary analysis.  These in 
general involve the broadening of horizons to include things that we take for granted 
                                                        
15 Latour, Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network Theory 
(Oxford, 2005). 
16 Latour, Modes of Existence, 212. 
   10 
(ideas, objects, techniques, and so forth) as involved in the networks of actants that 
make them possible.  From a particular kind of network—what Latour calls [TEC] 
for “Technology”—we raise our view to a broader, more encompassing mode of 
existence, [NET], which is the awareness of our existence as embedded in 
“Networks.”  In the embrace of the network, facts can be studied alongside spirits and 
mountains and laws as ontologically indistinct from each other.  This ontological 
flattening is akin, Latour argues, to opening up a black box—to revealing what is 
congealed in the elements of a process normally left tacit or invisible.   
The opening-up of black-boxes: this is what we have attempted, in a brief 
way, to do with Actor-Network Theory itself.  We have attempted to reveal its tools 
as themselves the sedimentation of certain historical networks coming into contact: 
science studies, discourse analysis, extended cognition, and so on.  And this returns 
us precisely to the second, related way that the eighteenth century remains critical in 
Latour’s account.  On the one hand, it is by discovering the Enlightenment in present-
day gestures, thoughts, media, tools, and techniques that Latour is able to discuss 
things like discourse or facts in their particular ecologies.  But this provides the 
background for a more general consideration of the ways we have ceased to be able to 
talk to each other: the modes of existence that divide left from right in the same way 
that they divided Hobbes from Boyle.  Put differently, the “modes” constitute the 
second way that Latour takes account of temporality and history, for these modes are 
flexible ways of being, linking and unlinking, coming from somewhere and going 
towards something else, but always in motion as they come into contact.  And their 
radical dissimilarity, the way that one mode of being (like the law) cannot recognize 
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the truth of others (like religion), is by Latour’s account a legacy of the eighteenth 
century—of being “modern.”17 
Latour’s theory of modes may be formalized in “pivot table” at the end of The 
Inquiry but his narrative sets them motion. Thus, Latour remarks that modes are, in 
the end, defined by the sort of “passes” they authorize.  A mode is, in this sense, 
precisely a way of being in the world that causes things to appear to be continuous or 
seamless with one another, in spite of the many discontinuities and differences that 
must exist; modes are the ways that different networks appear to be no networks at 
all.  Put differently modes are the continual and evolving ways that allow things to 
“pass” within the elements of a network.  In its simplest form, Latour remarks, these 
“passes” are akin to “a passing shot in basketball. ”  A certain phenomenon (like a 
fact) is witnessed to emerge out of the many functional elements (actants) inside and 
outside a laboratory; something like a vacuum may pass from an air pump, a 
pamphlet, to the discourse of witnesses, and so on.  Specific representations, Latour 
notes, “pass” from one medium to another.  This is the essence of [REP].  But, going 
himself one better, Latour insists that [REP] (the reproduction of a phenomenon 
across actants) is a special form of a more general phenomenon, and to grasp the way 
that modes work, we must in the end rid ourselves of the notion that “something is 
passed in the pass,” as Latour puts it, parenthetically, “(like a rugby ball).”18  In the 
end, he notes, “there are only passes,” the transformation of belief and ways of being.  
“Law” flows through a legal network, passing between actants, without a specific 
thing making the rounds; faith flows through a religious network, passing between 
actants, in a different way, but also without something specific doing the passing.  
                                                        
17 Law and religion are brought into contact by Latour in his Modes of Existence, 38-
43. 
18 “Pass” is one of the many terms in the Inquiry into the Modes of Existence that 
receives from Latour a technical definition in the online version of the book.  It is 
here that the Inquiry returns us to Serres’s example.  See “pass, passage,” in 
http://www.modesofexistence.org/crossings/#/en/voc. Accessed 9/12/2014. 
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These “passes,” taken together, constitute what Latour calls a “trajectory,” 
etymologically a “throw beyond” or “passing through”; the forms of these passes 
define the essence of modes as they evolve or are thrown from one moment in their 
many histories towards their futures.  Modes, in other words, are ephemeral things 
that may nevertheless be said to have persisted from the eighteenth century to the 
present. 
Registering our debts in these networks—and the modes they imply—
therefore occupies a major part of Latour’s work, one that continually asks us to 
revisit the eighteenth century’s legacy.  One particularly fruitful concept Latour has 
developed in this context is that of iconoclash, which Joseph Drury describes in his 
essay below as the “interpretive uncertainty” that follows an act of iconoclasm.  
Following Latour, Drury takes iconoclasm to be another characteristically modern act 
that “takes aim not so much at particular objects but at a way of thinking about 
objects that the Moderns find intolerable” (tk). That way of thinking about objects, 
we have suggested above, involves acknowledging and appreciating their role in the 
mediation and construction of reality.  The trouble with iconoclasm, Latour suggests, 
is that the hammer always “strikes sideways” — that is, the act of iconoclasm always 
exposes some unforeseen network of connections or results in some unintended 
consequence. Just as modes themselves straddle the eighteenth century and the 
present, so Drury employs Latour’s recent concept of iconoclash to explain the 
ambivalent treatment of iconoclasm in Matthew Gregory Lewis’ gothic novel The 
Monk (1796). A return to this moment helps more generally to illuminate the gothic’s 
ambivalent position both within and without religious institutions.  Among its many 
functions, the gothic is able to see religious institutions as, on the one hand, 
antiquated and corrupt social institutions in need of rational exposure and, on the 
other, indispensable forms of social stabilization and supplementation in a modern 
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society.  The gothic, for the way it crosses religion (REL) and law (LAW), would 
appear to be an early version of an inquiry into modes of existence. 
 
3. Actor Networks and the Humanities 
 
For many in the humanities, Latour’s writings resonate with the raft of 
arguments buoying up the appeal of things, objects, and a new, non-dialectical 
materialist strand of thinking.  Undoubtedly, there has been a wide surge of interest in 
the way that cultural history can be written from less anthropocentric perspectives, 
and just as the eighteenth century is, by Latour’s account, critical to the 
reconstruction of modernity, so too scholars of eighteenth-century literature and 
culture have been key to recovering the work of things in culture.  The very different 
work of such scholars as Jonathan Lamb, Sandra MacPherson, and Lynn Festa has 
found that objects in eighteenth-century literature served, even in the age of 
objectivity and reason, as primary models of attachment and irrationality.  They join 
an even wider range of scholars focusing on the autotelic affordances of objects 
themselves, on the way things move with their own intentions or actions, as 
something eighteenth-century writers and recognised, often in terms we are having to 
relearn today in recognition of our ongoing and increasingly evident involvement 
with the planet on which we live.  Taken together, this work constitutes a major 
revision of the way we understand Enlightenment modes and investments, for, like 
Latour’s project, this body of work means to complicate the Enlightenment’s own 
legacy.  
Still more germane to literary study is the way that scholars have invoked 
language as summoning up a world rich in lifelike things; the “objects being spoken 
of,” Latour himself remarks of this tendency, “become reality effects gliding over the 
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surface of writing.”19  It is no surprise in this light to find Belinda’s hair, Robinson 
Crusoe’s arsenal of objects, or the narrators of it-narratives quicken at the same 
moment as the genres and physical forms of novel, pamphlet, page.  In concert with 
more theoretical approaches disavowing the ontological centrality of the human and 
the linguistic, Latour’s work, along with work in the realm of Thing Theory and 
Object Orientated Ontology, seems to promise that even studies of representation 
might bypass language and thought as representation to look directly at the actions 
and effects of the material things it endows with life, and of the letters and surfaces 
that give it its own material substratum.  It is on these grounds, for instance, that 
Latour’s work found a home in Bill Brown’s Things (2003), the closest document to a 
manifesto in the literary thing-theoretical line—a volume that is incidentally over-
represented with scholars in eighteenth-century literature and culture.20 
It is worth remembering, however, that Latour has all along attempted, 
through different routes and strategies, to disavow the primal differences between 
object and subject, thing and person.  Latour’s role in the larger conversations around 
“Things” in literature can be usefully qualified if we think more closely about his 
refusal to see the object as occupying a distinct category of its own.  As we have seen, 
for Latour, the Enlightenment has enslaved us to the myth of the separation between 
object and subject.  Dialectical models, he insists, have only perpetuated the myth of 
their separation.  In their place, he describes nodes where objects and subjects merge: 
the writer and her pen, the speed bump and the driver who slows down become 
amalgams of human and non-human parts where change occurs.  His most plangent 
appeals revolve around a set of such neologisms adapted variously from Gabriel 
                                                        
19 Latour, We Have Never Been Modern, 63. 
20 Brown’s 2001 special issue of Critical Inquiry was republished as Brown, ed., 
Things (Chicago, 2003).  Also in Things are essays by Daniel Tiffany, Jonathan 
Lamb, Jessica Riskin, and Matthew L. Jones (on Descartes). 
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Tarde, and others: the actant, but also the hybrid, the quasi-object and quasi-subject, 
“things” in the word’s deepest and most inclusive senses.21 
From a literary perspective, it is significant that Latour does not blame 
language for concealing these entities from us.  The semiotic turn in philosophy and 
criticism may work to obscure the many crossings between commensurate actants, 
but language itself continually announces their presence.  In speech we readily 
describe the book that writes itself, the climate that changed, the girl who flew to 
China, implying that we acknowledge a range of events that originate in neither 
human nor technical causes. The cultural peculiarity of the moderns is that we have 
invested authority in the disciplines, modes, and institutions that erect and patrol 
artificial distinctions between the constructed and the empirical; the social and the 
physical; the document and the word processor; the discussion and the building that 
houses and enables it.  While we live in and speak of a reality that does not support 
these distinctions, we create ways to carry on as if they were tenable. The 
anthropologist of the moderns, channelled in the Inquiry as female, must make the 
actants and hybrids with which we unofficially live visible again.  She has language 
on her side in this quest.   
Thus, while Thing Theory, Object Orientated Ontology and the various brands 
of New Materialism can all be used against the linguistic turn in the humanities in 
their own way, Latour’s ontological pluralism—his insistence that there is no real 
distinction between subjects and objects, both of which can be constructions and 
agents of change—has a number of particular implications when it comes to reading 
literature.   The first of these involves the sanction Latour lends to tracking—and the 
inspiration he draws from finding—characters or objects that refuse in terms of their 
                                                        
21 See for instance the concluding chapter of We Have Never Been Modern.  On 
Latour and Tarde, see Latour, “Gabriel Tarde and the End of the Social,” in The 
Social in Question, ed. Patrick Joyce (New York, 2001), 117-32. 
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fictional representation to belong exclusively to either the human or non-human 
world.  Latour himself has argued that figuration features a model case of making the 
hybrid perceptible in the recognised cultural sphere of literature.22  Lamb’s work on 
the way objects inspire many of the categories associated with political and colonial 
violence in the eighteenth century also takes its cues from Latour, who licenses 
Lamb’s ground breaking approach to the discourses, for instance, of sovereignty and 
freedom, being rooted in the recognition of the way objects behave.23 Festa has 
claimed an equal porosity of the world of human attachment and sentiment, politics to 
object and animal as actor and subject.24  And Macpherson, working in the same 
period, looks at plots as having the status of material forms, with fictional tragedies 
being more invested in contingency than in human responsibility.25 
These studies, which see literary language as cooperative with, but not as 
entirely responsible for, the conflation of subject and object, can be distinguished 
from those associated more closely with Thing Theory.  For Thing Theory, to use a 
hypothetical example, a pair of swimming goggles that floats to the surface of a pool 
in the first lines of story might be read as uncannily displacing the appearance of a 
swimmer.  But the whole scenario would be closely connected to the question of 
literary representation, where things signify rather than act. “Things,” argues Brown, 
appear in texts where objects are “made to mean.”26  Thing Theory is concerned with 
the way representation endows objects with forms of agency originally human. 
Looking for them involves a methodological decision; a paying of attention to 
language rather than to the world with which it cannot intersect. 
                                                        
22 Latour, Reassembling the Social, 131. 
23 Lamb, The Things Things Say (Princeton, 2011). 
24 Lynn Festa, Sentimental Figures of Empire in Eighteenth-Century Britain and 
France  (John Hopkins University Press, 2006). 
25 Sandra Macpherson, Harm's Way: Tragic Responsibility and the Novel Form 
(Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010). 
26 Bill Brown, A Sense of Things: The Object Matter of American Literature 
(Chicago University Press, 2004), 17. 
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For those working with Latour, however, the site of interest is the conjunction 
of the swimmer who, while wearing the goggles, embodies the ability to swim 
differently, and the goggles, who when wearing the swimmer, acquire the ability to 
move.  While the swimmer-goggle entity eludes many of the categories of scientific 
and empirical description within which we are taught to think, fiction can plausibly 
honour its existence.  Fiction is predisposed towards doing so partly because its 
modes, metaphors and materiality are also entities of this kind.  Books teach us that 
words move us; figures we make can become forces in their own right; genres 
themselves enable and constrain emotional change.  But the role of literary language 
is not constitutive here in the way it is for the arguments of Brown, for whom fiction 
works in special ways to solicit this breakdown of subject or object, or for Elaine 
Freedgood, for whom figurative language intersects uneasily with the social and 
economic entanglement of a wide range of objects.27  Literary language, for Latour, is 
the rule rather than the exception, and the objects of fiction are native to rather than 
special agents in the world.   
In terms of eighteenth-century studies, taking up Latour’s method directly – 
rather than as a general invitation to think about objects – can therefore mean thinking 
quite deeply about literature in its own historical and material formation. Books 
function here less as media of representation than as ways of situating language in a 
wider network of exchange between people and things.  Miruna Stanica’s “Portraits 
of Delegation” offers an argument about eighteenth-century objects (a lock) and texts 
(it-narratives) carefully defined in its debt to Latour, rather than to thing theory.  For 
Stanica, the point is not to see these as cases where objects are endowed, either 
practically or imaginatively, with life, but to track their role in a web of relationships 
that runs multi-directionally between people and objects in patterns that defy causal 
                                                        
27 Freedgood, The Ideas in Things: Fugitive Meaning in the Victorian Novel 
(Chicago, 2006). 
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explanation or human origin.  Courtney Weiss Smith, on the other hand, engages in 
her essay on Anne Finch’s “Upon the Hurricane” quite directly with literary 
language.  Her account of the poem involves what we might traditionally recognise as 
a close reading in a tribute to the particular power of poetics to remake the world.  
Yet, while Smith’s piece explores figure, personification and metaphor, her sense of 
the interconnectedness of people and things in Finch’s description of a storm 
unleashed is insistent upon the possibility of this language effecting crossings that are 
already there in Finch’s experience.  Her real focus is on the way that Finch’s poem 
and its author find their own place in a natural world by which categories such as 
figure are allowed and given power.  The poem itself benefits from this reading as 
something that can be understood as part of a “storm” of media effects neither more 
nor less real than the weather.   
 
4. The Importance of Fiction 
 
Literature has frequently appeared, then, as an important category for Latour 
in explicating the conflation of the human and the material that modernity is inclined 
to overlook.  But it is really only with the Inquiry that we are told that “Fiction” is a 
“mode” central to descriptions of the world—including Latour’s own.28  The 
centrality of FIC is forcefully spelt out when it is placed alongside Law, Politics, 
Religion and other the modes operative in our making partial sense of the world.  
These modes, Laas we’ve seen above, are both created by and creative of us.  They 
funnel our actions and are made up of them.  They rely upon objects, and are created 
through them, but are most commonly characterised by their denial of this.  Their 
continuation over time and across a network is always the work of belief as well as of 
                                                        
28 Fiction is the subject of the ninth chapter of Modes of Existence, 233-58. 
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practical activity; the mountain, as much as the philosopher or the novel is the 
product of this “back and forth movement” that creates the illusion of continuity and a 
perceptible empirical domain.  In support of this illusion, Latour’s modes operate 
through “instauration,” using modes of “veridiction” that distinguish them from and 
relate them to other modes; each mode differently relates to an external world on 
which they generally claim to report.29  
 Fiction stands out in Latour’s line up of modes, not because it works 
differently from others, but because it is better than other modes at explicating the 
operation that they all deploy.  Although fiction is ideational, it explicitly depends on 
raw material (books, screens, props).  It needs work: of FIC, Latour writes, we know 
“you have to keep holding it so that it will hold you.”30  It supplies its own points of 
reference: it doesn’t pretend to report back on an external world: 
 
Here we have a mode like no other, defined by hesitation, vacillation, 
back-and-forth movements, the establishment of resonance between the 
successive layers of raw material from which are drawn provisionally 
figurations that nevertheless cannot separate themselves from the 
material.31 
 
Now in Latour’s terms, the same could be said of Law or Politics.  But it is not innate 
to these modes to acknowledge that props or screens or books enable their operation; 
nor to suggest that imaginative or emotional labour feeds their existence.  Although 
factual narratives rely just as strongly in Latour’s terms on imagination, figuration 
and materiality, their perversion is to cultivate the impression that they draw their 
                                                        
29 Latour, Modes of Existence, 53-66. 
30 Ibid., 247. 
31 Ibid., 244. 
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resources and their confirmation directly from reality.32 And yet, starting from the 
same basic and raw material, fictional and factual modes differ through the treatment 
to which we subject them—fiction carries us “away” whereas other factual narratives 
are tied by chains of reference to the world on which they report.33 
This means, to return to our earlier discussion of Latour’s historicity, that 
narrative becomes an important tool in the critic’s own workshop.  Latour himself 
evinces a powerful tendency towards narrative, for it is in tracing modes of existence 
that Latour mobilizes his most sweeping fictions.  The problem is to isolate a way of 
speaking about networks, without getting lost in complicated folds; likewise, the 
problem is to tell the story of modes of existence, without getting seduced by their 
special ways of being. Just as, in the case of networks, there is no a priori way to 
close them off—no limit to the potential backing up that would need to be done—so, 
with modes, there is no way to distinguish the analytic apparatus from the world it 
describes.  What is needed to capture the work of networks is a good story, something 
with a beginning, middle, and end: a bildungsroman; an it-narrative.  This is why, for 
Latour, [FIC] means to take seriously the reality of the networks that spring up 
around imaginary beings and works of art.  It is through [FIC] that we can make sense 
of modernity in the first place—a fact that helps account for Latour’s many fictions: 
the Constitution he imagines for modernity in We Have Never Been Modern; his 
whole approach to transit networks in Aramis; and the general plot and structure of 
his Inquiry into Modes of Existence, which is either a procedural mystery, a Faustian 
romance, or the coming-of-age novel of a young anthropologist, depending upon how 
you look at it.  There is no villain more villainous than Latour’s “Double-Click,” the 
personified impulse to disavow one’s own investments.  To make any headway at all 
in Latour’s work, we must in other words willingly inhabit the realm of [FIC].  We 
                                                        
32 Ibid., 251. 
33 Ibid., 249. 
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must accept that [DC] (“Double-Click”) exists, not as a personification, but just like 
any devil or djinn; this is how his Inquiry proceeds.  For [FIC] is the engine that 
makes visible the beings of modernity, its many modes summoned up as its villains 
and heroes.   
 With Latour’s definition of [FIC] in mind, we can situate the way in which 
William Warner argues below for the applicability of Latour, not to the reading of 
any particular eighteenth-century text, but to the way in which the novel is 
understood.  Eighteenth-century fictions, he suggests, are routinely deemed immature 
because they conflate reality and fiction at a fairly crude level, for instance by using 
paratexts and fictional editors to complicate the question of their authenticity.  If, 
Warner suggests, we take Latour’s descriptions of [FIC] fully as a descriptions of a 
process, we might see this, not as a failure of these novels to arrive at a fully fledged 
state of being fiction, but as their willingness to refuse the distinction between fiction 
and reality.  Fiction in these terms would be a way of handling reality that allows us 
to concede that even the most sublime or elevating experience arises from material 
conditions (Harry Potter can feel real and be switched off at the push of a button); a 
way of handling the things we make is no less real for being made. We know, for 
instance, that the life of fictional characters depends on us making room for them, 
allowing them to be.  [FIC] would be defined here not as a make-believe universe or 
parallel reality, but as being at its most developed. [FIC] is a meta-mode that 
facilitates awareness of the way all modes swing back and forth between subject and 
object. 
 In this collection, then, are the seeds of a much larger project, changing the 
way we describe the horizon and telos not just of forms like the novel, but of 
eighteenth-century thought generally.  The claims mooted here would, if taken 
seriously, have us rethink the way in which the university today is divided up; it 
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would realign literary-historical criticism with much more “scientific” disciplines.  
And it would do this both as we heed Lamb’s warning about Latour’s collapse of 
fiction into the world, even while we recognize, with Warner, the capacity for fiction 
to make manifest passes between things that modern modes hold apart.  Finally, as we 
have been arguing, the study of eighteenth-century literature would matter in this 
project as the preeminent site for a rapprochement; it is the place where the history of 
modernity, one that we have come commonly to think of as one of division, might be 
recast as one of inseparability.  While the essays in this collection do not exhaust this 
project—how could they?—they each offer signposts in its direction. 
 
